Hardly The Trial of The Century by Zimring, Franklin E.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 6 
1989 
Hardly The Trial of The Century 
Franklin E. Zimring 
University of California at Berkeley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Franklin E. Zimring, Hardly The Trial of The Century, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1307 (1989). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol87/iss6/10 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
HARDLY THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY 
Franklin E. Zimring * 
A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON 
TRIAL. By George P. Fletcher. New York: The Free Press. 1988. 
Pp. xi, 253. $19.95. 
The Bernhard Goetz case has become one of those landmark 
events in American criminal justice that spur people to write books 
and articles. While the case has provided constant fascination for a 
diversity of authors and disciplinary perspectives, the sort of book one 
writes about the Goetz case seems very much a function of the per-
spectives one brings to it. In this regard, the case and its literary prog-
eny evoke the tale of the International Symposium on the Elephant. 
The papers submitted to the Symposium ranged widely, we are told, 
and in a predictable pattern. The German contribution was called 
"The Elephant as Symbol and Actor in Western European History." 
The French paper was titled "The Love Life of the Elephant." The 
American contribution concerned "Practical Aspects of Elephant 
Training and Management." The Israeli delegate submitted a paper 
entitled "The Elephant and the Jewish Question." 
What is George Fletcher's particular interest in this Elephant? In 
his Preface, Fletcher, professor of law at Columbia University and 
longtime student of the comparative dimensions of the substantive 
criminal law, is forthright on the particular aspect of the case that 
tempted him to take pen in hand: 
It is rare, however, that the philosophical inquiries of the academic 
world have such a strong and direct bearing on the morality of interac-
tion in the oppressive world of. a filthy, graffiti-marred subway car. As 
the prosecution of Bernhard Goetz unfolded, it became clear to me that 
this was a case in which the theory of criminal law was indispensable to a 
proper understanding of what was going on. For many, the pending trial 
of Bernhard Goetz loomed as a struggle between black and white, be-
tween crime victims and the law-enforcement establishment. For me, 
the trial presented itself rather as a gripping realization of moral and 
theoretical questions that have long been on my agenda. [pp. ix-x]. 
For this reason, Fletcher became what he calls an "academic ob-
server" of the trial by jury of Mr. Goetz for a variety of charges stem-
ming from his December 1984 encounter in a New York City subway 
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with four young black males who approached him, asked him for 
money, and were shot. 
The book that resulted from Fletcher's observations is a mix of 
three chapters of substantive law followed by a six-chapter account of 
the trial told in chronological order from jury selection though verdict. 
The first chapter (pp. 1-17) sets the stage with a short summary of the 
facts of the subway shooting and a description of the maneuvers that 
led to the formal charges in New York State court. The next three 
chapters, while basep on aspects of the Goetz case, are excursions 
away from the particularity of the subway shooting into the moral and 
principled conundrums of special interest to Professor Fletcher. 
In "Passion and Reason in Self-Defense" (pp. 18-38), Fletcher 
shows how the competition between objective and subjective require-
ments for a valid claim of self-defense are a recurrent debate in the 
criminal law literature. In seeking to draw the line between criminal 
and noncriminal self-defensive use of deadly force, some scholars ar-
gue that the defense should only include behavior motivated by rea-
soned calculation, while others argue forcefully that the law should 
allow for passions as well. As a mixture of the facts of the Goetz case 
and the larger themes Fletcher wishes to pursue, this chapter is by far 
the book's most successful. 
The third chapter (pp. 39-62) continues the discussion of standards 
for self-defense, but is mostly concerned with the question of whether 
the defense of justification is limited by an objective standard in New 
York law, a question that was of importance in the pretrial skirmishes 
in People v. Goetz. 
"The Significance of Suffering" (pp. 63-83), is the last of the chap-
ters organized around a persistent problem in substantive criminal law 
- in this case the extent to which the harm done, as opposed to the 
harm risked or intended, should be the basis of penal liability. While 
these issues are less central to the Goetz case, the discussion is consist-
ently interesting. 
From this point on, the book becomes an annotated narrative of 
the Goetz trial with short chapters on jury selection, trial tactics, the 
now-famous two-hour taped statement by Goetz used as evidence in 
the trial, and discussions of excluded evidence and the role of the jury 
in criminal trials. 
This annotated narrative consumes more than half the book and 
culminates in a short chapter, "Mixed Messages" (pp. 199-217), where 
Fletcher tries to tie some of the conflicts about the meaning of the trial 
and verdict to the passion-versus-reason debate framed earlier. It is in 
these later chapters that the book suffers from an inability to sustain 
the reader's interest. 
The aim of the book is to reach a broad audience, one that presum-
ably includes nonlawyers. Professor Fletcher thus assumes little 
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knowledge about the workings of the criminal justice system and of 
criminal trials in telling the Goetz story, and the pedagogic tone and 
emphasis on basics may put off lawyers and advanced law students. 
Yet, I am uncertain about the value of this book as an introduction to 
the American crimin3.I trial process for the uninitiated. Certainly, any 
narrative on the Goetz case is unrepresentative of criminal justice 
processing and thus a poor introduction to the criminal justice system. 
But even as an introduction to major criminal trials, the book is in-
complete and leaves a host of questions unanswered: How did Goetz 
pay for his defense? Was a plea bargain offered? What will be the role 
of the appellate process? 
There is also some inconsistency in message between the two parts 
of the book that parallels the inconsistency in tone. In chapter two, 
the conflict between different foundations and theories of the limits of 
self-defense is presented as a perennial element of the criminal law: 
Passion and reason interact in the law of self-defense, then, by gener-
ating conflicting theories that nag at our loyalties when we seek to inter-
pret the vague contours of the defense. Passions impel us to think of 
defensive force as punitive and vengeful, inflicting deserved harm on 
wrongdoers. Reason invites us to think of self-defense as a means of 
maintaining order and harmony among independent, autonomous per-
sons. The historic struggle of the law has been from passion to reason, 
from inflicting just deserts to the vindication of the defender's autonomy. 
Other theories, such as self-defense as an excuse based on an involuntary 
response and the social theory of justifiable self-defense, complicate the 
task of reason. [p. 37] 
Later, however, in his discussion of the trial, Fletcher seems more in-
clined to regard the public support of Goetz's actions as a sign of the 
current times, "remind[ing] us, painfully, of the difference between the 
mentality of the 1960s and that of the 1980s" (p. 209). 
The better interpretation here is that public sympathy for violent 
self-help against burglars and robbers is chronically high. The so-
called spring-gun cases produced the same kind of tug-of-war in the 
1960s as they do in the 1980s. Support for armed self-help is not a 
recent phenomenon. Instead, shooting criminals is a standard Ameri-
can enthusiasm. 
If the Goetz case is not of special value in judging the unique tem-
per of the 1980s, what is there about this case that justifies its 
landmark status in public discussions of crime and criminal justice? 
Perhaps there is less than we might suppose. 
Indeed, one key to the sense of disappointment many will feel 
about this book is the fact that the Goetz trial does not deserve the 
close scrutiny Professor Fletcher provides. No great issue of morality 
or law was presented to the jury and none was decided. The jury ac-
quitted the defendant of all charges except one felony gun count. Per-
haps the verdict represented a willingness to allow greater latitude in 
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self-defense, but it did allow the imposition of a felony sentence, and 
thus has many features of a classic jury compromise. Professor 
Fletcher's close observation of the trial provides no stunning new ex-
planation of the jury verdict, in large part because that verdict gener-
ated no great sense of mystery among the general public or 
professional observers. 
Perhaps the incident which gave Bernhard Goetz his measure of 
notoriety was interesting because it typified a longstanding conflict in 
the law of self-defense. But the trial itself produced little to justify 
Fletcher's investment of time or attention, or that of the reader in the 
book's final seven chapters. The book fails to find the deeper meanings 
of the trial of Bernhard Goetz, most probably because they do not 
exist. 
A Crime of Self-Defense is thus hampered by uncertainties of audi-
ence, method, and message that leave it something of a disappoint-
ment. The materials on substantive criminal law are far more original 
and more interesting than the narrative of the trial. This version of 
the trial is a story without a conspicuous moral, leaving the reader 
with a strong sense of anti-climax at book's end. 
Still, this rendering of the case will probably be among the very 
best available. And the author's section on passion and reason in the 
law of self-defense will be of substantial value to criminal law students 
and scholars. 
